A Cyber-Resilience Risk Management Architecture for Distributed Wind

Publicly accessible License 

Distributed wind is an electric energy resource segment with strong potential to be deployed in many applications, but special consideration of resilience and cybersecurity is needed to address the unique conditions associated with distributed wind. Distributed wind is a strong candidate to help meet renewable energy and carbon-free energy goals. However, care must be taken as more systems are installed to ensure that the systems are reliable, resilient, and secure. The physical and communications requirements for distributed wind mean that there are unique cybersecurity considerations, but there is little to no existing guidance on best practices for cybersecurity risk management for distributed wind systems specifically. This research develops an architecture for managing cyber risks associated with distributed wind systems through resilience functions. The architecture takes into account the configurations, challenges, and standards for distributed wind to create a risk-focused perspective that considers threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. We show how the resilience functions of identification, preparation, detection, adaptation, and recovery can mitigate cyber threats. We discuss common distributed wind architectures and interconnections to larger power systems. Because cybersecurity cannot exist independently, the cyber-resilience architecture must consider the system holistically. Finally, we discuss risk assessment recommendations with special emphasis on what sets distributed wind systems apart from other distributed energy resources (DER).

Citation Formats

TY - DATA AB - Distributed wind is an electric energy resource segment with strong potential to be deployed in many applications, but special consideration of resilience and cybersecurity is needed to address the unique conditions associated with distributed wind. Distributed wind is a strong candidate to help meet renewable energy and carbon-free energy goals. However, care must be taken as more systems are installed to ensure that the systems are reliable, resilient, and secure. The physical and communications requirements for distributed wind mean that there are unique cybersecurity considerations, but there is little to no existing guidance on best practices for cybersecurity risk management for distributed wind systems specifically. This research develops an architecture for managing cyber risks associated with distributed wind systems through resilience functions. The architecture takes into account the configurations, challenges, and standards for distributed wind to create a risk-focused perspective that considers threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. We show how the resilience functions of identification, preparation, detection, adaptation, and recovery can mitigate cyber threats. We discuss common distributed wind architectures and interconnections to larger power systems. Because cybersecurity cannot exist independently, the cyber-resilience architecture must consider the system holistically. Finally, we discuss risk assessment recommendations with special emphasis on what sets distributed wind systems apart from other distributed energy resources (DER). AU - Culler, Megan J A2 - Morash, Sean A3 - Smith, Brian A4 - Cleveland, Frances A5 - Gentle, Jake DB - C-MIX - Community Microgrid Information Exchange DP - Open EI | National Laboratory of the Rockies DO - 10.1109/RWS52686.2021.9611786 KW - Wind energy KW - Battery energy storage KW - Solar KW - Photovoltaics KW - PV KW - Diesel generators KW - Other liquid-fuel generators KW - Cybersecurity KW - Resilience KW - Extreme weather KW - Standards KW - Interconnection KW - Protection KW - Case studies KW - Performance LA - English DA - 2021/10/18 PY - 2021 PB - Idaho National Laboratory T1 - A Cyber-Resilience Risk Management Architecture for Distributed Wind UR - https://doi.org/10.1109/RWS52686.2021.9611786 ER -
Export Citation to RIS
Culler, Megan J, et al. A Cyber-Resilience Risk Management Architecture for Distributed Wind. Idaho National Laboratory, 18 October, 2021, C-MIX - Community Microgrid Information Exchange. https://doi.org/10.1109/RWS52686.2021.9611786.
Culler, M., Morash, S., Smith, B., Cleveland, F., & Gentle, J. (2021). A Cyber-Resilience Risk Management Architecture for Distributed Wind. [Data set]. C-MIX - Community Microgrid Information Exchange. Idaho National Laboratory. https://doi.org/10.1109/RWS52686.2021.9611786
Culler, Megan J, Sean Morash, Brian Smith, Frances Cleveland, and Jake Gentle. A Cyber-Resilience Risk Management Architecture for Distributed Wind. Idaho National Laboratory, October, 18, 2021. Distributed by C-MIX - Community Microgrid Information Exchange. https://doi.org/10.1109/RWS52686.2021.9611786
@misc{CMIX_Dataset_390, title = {A Cyber-Resilience Risk Management Architecture for Distributed Wind}, author = {Culler, Megan J and Morash, Sean and Smith, Brian and Cleveland, Frances and Gentle, Jake}, abstractNote = {Distributed wind is an electric energy resource segment with strong potential to be deployed in many applications, but special consideration of resilience and cybersecurity is needed to address the unique conditions associated with distributed wind. Distributed wind is a strong candidate to help meet renewable energy and carbon-free energy goals. However, care must be taken as more systems are installed to ensure that the systems are reliable, resilient, and secure. The physical and communications requirements for distributed wind mean that there are unique cybersecurity considerations, but there is little to no existing guidance on best practices for cybersecurity risk management for distributed wind systems specifically. This research develops an architecture for managing cyber risks associated with distributed wind systems through resilience functions. The architecture takes into account the configurations, challenges, and standards for distributed wind to create a risk-focused perspective that considers threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. We show how the resilience functions of identification, preparation, detection, adaptation, and recovery can mitigate cyber threats. We discuss common distributed wind architectures and interconnections to larger power systems. Because cybersecurity cannot exist independently, the cyber-resilience architecture must consider the system holistically. Finally, we discuss risk assessment recommendations with special emphasis on what sets distributed wind systems apart from other distributed energy resources (DER).}, url = {https://cmix.openei.org/submissions/390}, year = {2021}, howpublished = {C-MIX - Community Microgrid Information Exchange, Idaho National Laboratory, https://doi.org/10.1109/RWS52686.2021.9611786}, note = {Accessed: 2026-06-18}, doi = {10.1109/RWS52686.2021.9611786} }
https://dx.doi.org/10.1109/RWS52686.2021.9611786

Details

Data from Oct 18, 2021

Last updated Mar 30, 2026

Submitted Jun 2, 2026

Organization

Idaho National Laboratory

Contact

Megan J. Culler

Authors

Megan J Culler

Idaho National Laboratory

Sean Morash

EnerNex

Brian Smith

EnerNex

Frances Cleveland

Xanthus Consulting International

Jake Gentle

Idaho National Laboratory
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