A Cyber-Resilience Risk Management Architecture for Distributed Wind
Distributed wind is an electric energy resource segment with strong potential to be deployed in many applications, but special consideration of resilience and cybersecurity is needed to address the unique conditions associated with distributed wind. Distributed wind is a strong candidate to help meet renewable energy and carbon-free energy goals. However, care must be taken as more systems are installed to ensure that the systems are reliable, resilient, and secure. The physical and communications requirements for distributed wind mean that there are unique cybersecurity considerations, but there is little to no existing guidance on best practices for cybersecurity risk management for distributed wind systems specifically. This research develops an architecture for managing cyber risks associated with distributed wind systems through resilience functions. The architecture takes into account the configurations, challenges, and standards for distributed wind to create a risk-focused perspective that considers threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. We show how the resilience functions of identification, preparation, detection, adaptation, and recovery can mitigate cyber threats. We discuss common distributed wind architectures and interconnections to larger power systems. Because cybersecurity cannot exist independently, the cyber-resilience architecture must consider the system holistically. Finally, we discuss risk assessment recommendations with special emphasis on what sets distributed wind systems apart from other distributed energy resources (DER).
Citation Formats
TY - DATA
AB - Distributed wind is an electric energy resource segment with strong potential to be deployed in many applications, but special consideration of resilience and cybersecurity is needed to address the unique conditions associated with distributed wind. Distributed wind is a strong candidate to help meet renewable energy and carbon-free energy goals. However, care must be taken as more systems are installed to ensure that the systems are reliable, resilient, and secure. The physical and communications requirements for distributed wind mean that there are unique cybersecurity considerations, but there is little to no existing guidance on best practices for cybersecurity risk management for distributed wind systems specifically. This research develops an architecture for managing cyber risks associated with distributed wind systems through resilience functions. The architecture takes into account the configurations, challenges, and standards for distributed wind to create a risk-focused perspective that considers threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. We show how the resilience functions of identification, preparation, detection, adaptation, and recovery can mitigate cyber threats. We discuss common distributed wind architectures and interconnections to larger power systems. Because cybersecurity cannot exist independently, the cyber-resilience architecture must consider the system holistically. Finally, we discuss risk assessment recommendations with special emphasis on what sets distributed wind systems apart from other distributed energy resources (DER).
AU - Culler, Megan J
A2 - Morash, Sean
A3 - Smith, Brian
A4 - Cleveland, Frances
A5 - Gentle, Jake
DB - C-MIX - Community Microgrid Information Exchange
DP - Open EI | National Laboratory of the Rockies
DO - 10.1109/RWS52686.2021.9611786
KW - Wind energy
KW - Battery energy storage
KW - Solar
KW - Photovoltaics
KW - PV
KW - Diesel generators
KW - Other liquid-fuel generators
KW - Cybersecurity
KW - Resilience
KW - Extreme weather
KW - Standards
KW - Interconnection
KW - Protection
KW - Case studies
KW - Performance
LA - English
DA - 2021/10/18
PY - 2021
PB - Idaho National Laboratory
T1 - A Cyber-Resilience Risk Management Architecture for Distributed Wind
UR - https://doi.org/10.1109/RWS52686.2021.9611786
ER -
Culler, Megan J, et al. A Cyber-Resilience Risk Management Architecture for Distributed Wind. Idaho National Laboratory, 18 October, 2021, C-MIX - Community Microgrid Information Exchange. https://doi.org/10.1109/RWS52686.2021.9611786.
Culler, M., Morash, S., Smith, B., Cleveland, F., & Gentle, J. (2021). A Cyber-Resilience Risk Management Architecture for Distributed Wind. [Data set]. C-MIX - Community Microgrid Information Exchange. Idaho National Laboratory. https://doi.org/10.1109/RWS52686.2021.9611786
Culler, Megan J, Sean Morash, Brian Smith, Frances Cleveland, and Jake Gentle. A Cyber-Resilience Risk Management Architecture for Distributed Wind. Idaho National Laboratory, October, 18, 2021. Distributed by C-MIX - Community Microgrid Information Exchange. https://doi.org/10.1109/RWS52686.2021.9611786
@misc{CMIX_Dataset_390,
title = {A Cyber-Resilience Risk Management Architecture for Distributed Wind},
author = {Culler, Megan J and Morash, Sean and Smith, Brian and Cleveland, Frances and Gentle, Jake},
abstractNote = {Distributed wind is an electric energy resource segment with strong potential to be deployed in many applications, but special consideration of resilience and cybersecurity is needed to address the unique conditions associated with distributed wind. Distributed wind is a strong candidate to help meet renewable energy and carbon-free energy goals. However, care must be taken as more systems are installed to ensure that the systems are reliable, resilient, and secure. The physical and communications requirements for distributed wind mean that there are unique cybersecurity considerations, but there is little to no existing guidance on best practices for cybersecurity risk management for distributed wind systems specifically. This research develops an architecture for managing cyber risks associated with distributed wind systems through resilience functions. The architecture takes into account the configurations, challenges, and standards for distributed wind to create a risk-focused perspective that considers threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. We show how the resilience functions of identification, preparation, detection, adaptation, and recovery can mitigate cyber threats. We discuss common distributed wind architectures and interconnections to larger power systems. Because cybersecurity cannot exist independently, the cyber-resilience architecture must consider the system holistically. Finally, we discuss risk assessment recommendations with special emphasis on what sets distributed wind systems apart from other distributed energy resources (DER).},
url = {https://cmix.openei.org/submissions/390},
year = {2021},
howpublished = {C-MIX - Community Microgrid Information Exchange, Idaho National Laboratory, https://doi.org/10.1109/RWS52686.2021.9611786},
note = {Accessed: 2026-06-18},
doi = {10.1109/RWS52686.2021.9611786}
}
https://dx.doi.org/10.1109/RWS52686.2021.9611786
Details
Data from Oct 18, 2021
Last updated Mar 30, 2026
Submitted Jun 2, 2026
Organization
Idaho National Laboratory
Contact
Megan J. Culler

